Introduction
The geographic and economic setting of the nineteenth century Upper Great Lakes region created unique challenges to American settler colonialism and encounters with the Indigenous people of this land of lakes and forests. Many Anishinaabeg bands responded creatively through the use of Christianity, education, and American law in an attempt to fortify their presence in the region. European Americans, who sought to appropriate the wealth of the Upper Midwest's vast stands of hardwood and pine forests, only seldom needed to resort to guns to take control of the land. Instead of a war of conquest they entangled Anishinaabeg property owners in a bewildering legal and extralegal thicket that facilitated the plunder of the region's most marketable resource. The initial phase of pine logging laid waste to Anishinaabeg property rights but left the Indigenous population remaining on their traditional lands. The ill treatment of Anishinaabeg landowners should have been a warning signal to policymakers in the 1880s seeking to reform national Indian policy through severalty.
In his 2012 study of Great Lakes Indian history in the colonial and early national periods, historian Michael Witgen emphasizes the transregional society shared by the Anishinaabeg while at the same time documenting the "fl exibility" and autonomy of action reserved to local bands. This essay is concerned with the Indigenous response to the lumber frontier's variation of settler colonialism in the Upper Great Lakes region-the heartland of the Anishinaabeg. The bulk of the essay, however, is anchored in northern Lower Michigan with the inclusion of some examples from northern Wisconsin and Minnesota. The Odawa, Ojibwe, and Potawatomi in Lower Michigan-sometimes known as the Three Fires Confederacy and who all embraced the native name Anishinaabeg-did not respond to the intrusion of lumbering in the same way as bands in other parts of the region. Yet the impact of the logging frontier on the Indigenous people was, with rare exceptions, strikingly similar.
1
In the Wake of the "Middle Ground"
What Richard White famously dubbed a "middle ground" of cooperation and cultural exchange that marked the Great Lakes frontier in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries endured after the conclusion of the second war with Great Britain. The cultural forms and economic relations of that earlier period of French and British regimes in the region only slowly waned over several decades under American suzerainty.
2 The latent military power of the Indigenous people of the Great Lakes region, together with the lingering possibility of their receiving support from British Canada, inclined American offi cials and pioneer traders to follow for a time the previously established cultural norms. This process did not take place in the area south of Lakes Erie and Michigan. Here the old fur trade ways were swept away by a quickly rising tide of agricultural settlers. Yet during the 1820s the Anishinaabeg of the northern Great Lakes faced no such direct pressure and were allowed time in which they could take stock of their relations with the American state and to initiate strategies of resistance and accommodation.
Several Anishinaabeg bands adopted bold strategies designed to both frustrate a United States government intent on carrying out the policy of Indian removal and to reposition their bands in the changing economy and politics of the antebellum era. The United States government had a twofaced policy toward Indigenous peoples. On one hand, it was committed to the taking of Indian land in order to accommodate its swelling agricultural population, yet it also claimed to be committed to "civilizing" Indians so they could eventually be incorporated into the general population. In 1821 Lewis Cass, the governor of the Michigan Territory (which then embraced the entirety of the Upper Great Lakes region), visited the people of the region. Accompanying him was Reverend Jedidiah Morse, who en-couraged the Indians to accept Christian missionaries with the threat "Civilization or ruin." Faced with this pressure, two groups of Anishinaabeg, independent of each other, elected to embrace a path to "civilization," but in such a way that it was under their control. These were the Potawatomi in southwestern Michigan under the leadership of Leopold Pokagon and the Odawa in the Little Traverse Bay area of northwestern Michigan, under Apokisigan and Mackadepenessy. Spurning Protestant missionaries offered by the government, they solicited instead the assistance of the Roman Catholic Church. In a series of petitions sent by the Odawa Mackadepenessy to the Pope in Rome, the president of the United States, and even the King of France, he specifi cally requested Jesuit missionaries. In doing this they were reviving a relationship that went back to Jacques Marquette, S. J. and the black robes of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as well as making common cause with the French and Metis (mixed bloods) who still played a dominant role in the European American commerce of the region. At the same time they selected a branch of Christianity that was decidedly independent, almost at odds, with the settler state that threatened them. By this path the Anishinaabeg could increase their access to a new source of sacred power and claim to have embarked on the path to civilization-yet also keep the United States government at bay.
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The embrace of Catholicism by several Anishinaabeg bands was calculated, but it would be wrong to see it as purely political. In the wake of the War of 1812, the native people of the Great Lakes were in crisis. Military means of defending their homeland had failed and the old fur trade economy was faltering. A new source of spiritual power was needed as well as a new tactic to deal with the American state. The marginal status of the Catholic Church allowed Indian leaders to control the pace of change. So weak was the Catholic Church in Michigan in 1823, the date of the fi rst Odawa petitions, that there was only a single priest in the entire territory. For several years the Odawa actually carried out a process of self-evangelization in which tribal lay ministers exposed to the new faith in the East taught prayers, built a chapel, and even began instruction in literacy. By the 1830s the Catholic Church in the United States was fi nally strong enough to send resident missionaries. Indigenous autonomy in the process, however, remained strong. This was in part because among the Odawa, the missionaries sent by the Church came from Slovenia. They spoke Latin, French, Slovenian, German, and worked to become fl uent in Anishinaabeg languages as well. Their lack of English language skills and knowledge of America, however, limited their ability to meddle in the Odawa's relations with the United States. The embrace of Catholicism enabled the Pokagon band of Potawatomi to avoid their removal from the Michigan Territory. At the 1833 Treaty of Chicago they were excluded from the order to remove west and initially instructed to relocate among their co-religious Odawa near Little Traverse. Later they received their own reservation in southern Michigan. The Odawa of Little Traverse used the 1836 Treaty of Washington to secure what were initially promised to be large permanent reservations in their homeland. After they returned to Michigan, the Senate "revised" the agreement and limited their tenure there to a mere fi ve-year period before removal. Yet like the Pokagon, the Odawa were able to frustrate removal by using the funds received for the sale of their western Michigan estate to make private land purchases. Federal treaties also guaranteed the Anishinaabeg the right to hunt and fi sh on the ceded territory until it was "required for settlement." This proved important for the Odawa who were actively engaged in commercial fi shing for America's growing urban markets. Many other Anishinaabeg bands, particularly those in southern Michigan, did not fare so well and suffered removal or simply outright dispossession. The Ojibwe of Swan Creek, Black River, and Saginaw Bay in eastern Michigan were systematically stripped of their estate by a series of treaties between 1837 and 1838. Decimated by smallpox, a small number accepted removal to Kansas while the remnant took refuge in a series of Methodist mission settlements.
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The Panic of 1837, which practically brought to a halt the settlement of Michigan by European Americans, and the fact that the lands of central and northern Michigan were less attractive to agriculturalists than prairie tracts further west, also played a role in allowing some Indigenous people to avoid removal. However, as the decade of the 1840s ended, Michigan-unlike other midwestern states such as Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois-continued to have a large Indigenous population. Some, like the Odawa in the northwest, had their own land base and others like the Saginaw Ojibwe were largely landless and indigent. The question of how the State of Michigan should deal with the populations left by the old fur trade era became an issue at a convention called in 1850 to draft a new Michigan constitution. Representatives from northern Michigan were determined that mixed-bloods who descended from Anishinaabeg and European relationships be recognized as citizens with full civil rights. They were a sizable portion of the community and some were among the leading busi-nessmen and-women in the region. Therefore, when the 1850 constitution was approved, it included a clause stating that every "male inhabitant of Indian descent, a native of the United States and not a member of a tribe" be recognized as a citizen. This carefully worded legal change became very broadly interpreted due to the activism of the Andrew J. Blackbird (Odawa) . He was the educated son of Mackadepenessy whose petitions had fi rst brought Catholic mission schools to Little Traverse Bay. Blackbird lobbied the state chief justice, the governor, and the legislature to include not just mixed-bloods but all Indians wishing to be citizens. It seems state offi cials saw this as a long-term solution to the state's "Indian Problem." Blackbird even prevailed upon the legislature to send a formal resolution to Congress requesting that the federal government make "arrangements" for the "permanent location" of the Anishinaabeg "in the northern part of this state."
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The solution to the Indian problem in Michigan foreshadowed the Dawes Act approach that the government would adopt three decades later. In 1855 the federal government recognized Michigan Indians' new civil status and the fact that removal was neither feasible nor desirable. Commissioner of Indian Affairs George Manypenny negotiated a new series of treaties with the Anishinaabeg. The 1855 Treaty with the Odawa and Ojibwe of northern Michigan created a series of reservations of public land from which tribal members could select family allotments of eighty acres. While Indians could occupy the land immediately upon selection, actual title to the land would be held in trust by the federal government for a period of ten years. A similar treaty was made with the Saginaw-area Ojibwe. The treaties also set up a series of schools for Indian youths to be funded for ten years. Once tribal land allotment was concluded, the areas set aside as reservations would be open to all interested buyers. It is signifi cant and refl ective of the optimism of Manypenny, and indeed the State of Michigan, that the trust period for these allotments was only set at ten years, not the twenty-fi ve later incorporated in the Dawes Act.
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With the 1855 treaties the federal government thought it had laid out a program by which it would be free of Indian responsibilities in Michigan within ten years. While Michigan remained the largest Indian agency in the country and it operated the largest government school system in the nation, the plan was for all trust responsibilities and treaty liabilities to end in ten years. At that point the tribal status of the Odawa and Ojibwe would cease, and they would simply be state citizens. The Odawa and Ojibwe thereby successfully evaded the federal removal program. This was in part because of their strategic response to American pressure and in part because agriculturally focused American settler colonialism bypassed their homeland in favor of trans-Mississippi prairie lands. The greatest challenge for the Anishinaabeg, however, lay in front of them in the form of the European American logging frontier.
The Logging Frontier
Settler colonialism is a transnational process by which an incoming population displaces the Indigenous people and establishes their own sovereign regimes. In the words of the Australian anthropologist Patrick Wolfe, "settler colonialism destroys to replace." Like all forms of settler colonialism, the logging industry brought a transformative socioeconomic system, one that had been perfected in the forests of New England to the Great Lakes region. The logging frontier was a facet of European American colonialism that was vastly different than the agriculturally based settlement system that succeeded in displacing Indigenous people in the Ohio Valley and along the lower Great Lakes. Lumbermen were like the fur traders that fi rst encountered the Anishinaabeg in only one signifi cant way: They were focused on acquiring a single resource from the Great Lakes environment, and they were content to destroy that resource in the process of acquiring it.
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Unlike the fur traders, European Americans interested in accessing logs for lumber did not require Indian labor to secure this resource. The Anishinaabeg had hunted furs for their own use for centuries before the arrival of the Europeans, and they brought to the trade the skills necessary to most effi ciently acquire and process the desired product. Although the Indigenous people of the Great Lakes forest had prodigious woodworking skills, logging on a commercial scale was not something that Indigenous people practiced. It brought a transformation of the environment they had not ever even imagined. In Michigan as well as most of the Great Lakes region, Indians were drawn into participating in the lumber industry as lumberjacks and river drivers. Indians who in the 1870s and 1880s took jobs as loggers did so out of a need for cash income following the loss of land tenure. Some native communities even managed a number of small logging operations on their own; however, unlike the fur trade, it was Indian land-not Indigenous labor-which was crucial to the economic enterprise.
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While both the fur trade and the lumber industry relied upon what European Americans regarded as "wilderness" landscapes for their extractive pursuits, the lumber industry faced daunting logistical challenges as it sought to establish itself in the region. The fur trade had been an ideal economy for a remote region since it revolved around the harvesting and transport of a lightweight, high-value product. In contrast, the lumber industry focused on a heavy, unwieldy product that was of commercial value only in large volume. Removing timber from the forest, transporting it to where it could be milled, and getting it to a market was the economic challenge of the lumber industry as it moved into the Great Lakes region. Since this necessitated considerable capital investment, there were few industrial scale attempts at exploiting forest resources until treaties of cession had reduced Indigenous title to the land of the Upper Great Lakes region. The lumber industry's transformative socioeconomic system differed profoundly from agricultural settlement. It brought only a small permanent population but required a broad appropriation of forest lands. During the pine logging phase of the industry-which began in the 1840s, accelerated in the 1860s, and climaxed in Lower Michigan in the 1880s-temporary lumber camps were established in the interior to plunder the surrounding area and then after a season or two relocate to a new site. Cut timber was fl oated downstream, usually to lakeshore urban settlements where it could be milled and shipped by schooner to market. Lumbermen's occupation of the land was fl eeting but often devastating to the environment. While agriculturalists usually planted homesteads with an eye to permanent occupation, lumbermen sought the main chance for the short run. The lumber industry variation on settler colonialism did not require the complete displacement of the Indigenous population so long as forest resources could be appropriated. Hence native people could persist in their homelands in spite of logging as long as their control over the forest was broken. Even after pine logging was completed in a region, the lands remained integrated into the Anglo American settler state to be exploited for their hardwood trees and later for so-called "weed trees" for pulpwood, or to become hardscrabble cutover farms.
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The fi rst industrial use of the forest resources of the Upper Great Lakes region was by the shipping industry. In the 1840s more than three hundred steamboats plied the Great Lakes, carrying cargoes and settlers from the Erie Canal at Buffalo to Chicago and other points west. Mostly powered by wood, these vessels were required to make numerous stops to replenish their supply of fuel. Cordwood stations were set up all along the lakeshore by entrepreneurs who freely cut down trees on government or even unced-ed Indian land. Prior to the cession of their lands, Indians complained to federal authorities about this intrusion upon their resource base. In 1834 the Odawa headman Pabanmitabi insisted "if any wood is cut upon our land . . . we should be paid for it." The timber on islands and peninsulas was the easiest to exploit since it was adjacent to maritime transportation, and many of those sites were denuded to feed steamship fi reboxes. The habit of stealing timber only increased following the cession of most Indian land in Michigan in 1836.
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From the mid-nineteenth to well after the turn of the twentieth century, the Great Lakes region was caught up in a green gold rush in which timber created more millionaires than the California Gold Rush. The value to come out of Michigan's deep woods alone far outstripped the value to come from California gold mines between 1849 and 1900. This logging frontier was shaped by the economics of harvesting and processing large amounts of standing timber into lumber. Lumbermen had four big expenses: the acquisition of standing timber, the cutting of the trees into logs, the transportation of the logs to the site of a mill, and milling of the logs into dimension lumber (to this could also sometimes be added the transport of the lumber to a market). The opportunity for profi t could be enhanced by reducing or eliminating the cost of any of those necessary steps. The logging frontier's particular brand of settler colonialism fl owed out of lumberman's inevitable confl ict and occasional cooperation with Anishinaabeg. The logging frontier provided occasional employment of native people in cutting or fl oating logs, but also impinged upon usufruct rights, resulted in timber theft, and the fraudulent taking of Indian land.
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Pioneer logging ventures brought little benefi t and some disruption to Indigenous people. In the 1850s and 1860s Indian men were not considered competent to join the lumberjacks in felling and transporting trees. This seems to have stemmed from longstanding white fear and mistrust of Indians by European Americans as well as the fact that few Anishinaabeg could speak English and, therefore, could not work effectively with logging crews. It was not until the 1870s and later that Indians with the necessary language skills began to join the shanty boys as sawyers, swampers, and river drivers. What early logging brought to Indian country was a disruption of traditional subsistence practices. Fish weirs that had been used and maintained for generations were often torn apart to clear rivers and streams for the spring log drive. Those changes further compromised aboriginal subsistence by ruining spawning areas along rivers through silt-ation and changes in water temperature. Berry patches and maple sugar groves could also be disrupted, especially in later years when hardwood trees were targeted by loggers. In Wisconsin and Minnesota where wild rice that grew along the rivers was a critical part of the Anishinaabeg diet, loggers drowned the crop by raising water levels for log drives. The Ojibwe sometimes responded to this by opening dams or even tearing them down, which brought confrontations with the angry lumbermen. In 1854 the most serious of these disputes occurred over a logging dam at the source of Minnesota's Rum River that destroyed wild rice grounds on Mille Lacs. Following disputes that left two lumberjacks and one Ojibwe dead, the U.S. Army and the Minnesota governor intervened, and eventually the Mille Lacs band received compensation for their crop loss.
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As the logging industry developed in the Great Lakes region, it was marked by a diversity of participants-from small, poorly capitalized entrants into the trade to large-scale operators with vertically integrated corporations that captured all stages of production, from the forest to mill and market. Another crucial facet of logging was that it necessitated substantial upfront capital outlays before any profi t could be accrued. For example, a small operator attempting to enter the business had to purchase timberlands; build a lumber camp; hire, equip, and feed a logging crew for four to fi ve months; and move hundreds of large logs to a mill-all before any profi t could be realized. That heavy burden of capital outlay encouraged logging operations to frequently seek illegal means to reduce cost. The easiest way to do that, especially in the 1850s and 1860s when the region was sparsely inhabited, was to cut logs on unpurchased, usually government, and sometimes Indian land.
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Timber stealing on public land began in the 1830s and grew to such sizeable portions in the 1850s that the Department of the Interior had to appoint agents to northern Michigan, Wisconsin, and Minnesota. They were charged with investigating cases of illegal logging, confi scating the logs or lumber, and working with the United States District Attorney to prosecute the guilty parties. In 1854 agent Isaac Willard took a small boat up the Lake Michigan shore from Grand Haven to beyond Manistee, Michigan, and he found innumerable trespasses upon the public lands. Thirtyseven indictments followed, including for violations of an Ojibwe reservation at Manistee. The Indians had objected to the initial intrusion of the lumbermen, but the hungry members of the local band had been bought off with gifts of pork and fl our. The Ojibwe were less accommodating on Wisconsin's St. Croix River when a group of warriors stopped a log drive with the notice: "We have no money for logs; we have no money for land. Logs cannot go." Those words, backed by an implicit threat of violence, proved more effective than federal agent arrest warrants. In what proved a harbinger of things to come, antebellum agents in Michigan proved better at identifying timber thefts than stopping the practice. The federal agents were not able to secure the cooperation of local offi cials, ship owners, or even the compliance of the local community who saw their economic selfinterest resting with the timber thieves. Timber thefts only increased in succeeding decades, and by 1879 it was such an issue that President Rutherford B. Hayes mentioned the problem in his State of the Union message and requested specifi c legislation to speed prosecution. While the federal government struggled to come to terms with timber thefts, it did act as an agent for the logging industry in pushing for the Anishinaabeg to cede their lands in exchange for reservations. The St. Croix Ojibwe, who were among the fi rst bands confronted with lumber industry expansion, were well aware that the white men wanted their pine timber. In treaty negotiations with the United States they sagely proposed to cede their lands for the term of sixty years: "It is hard to give up the lands. They will remain and cannot be destroyed but you may cut down the trees and others will grow up." The government, however, insisted on taking full title to their homeland. Sixty years later the St. Croix valley was a devastated cutover, and most of the lumbermen had moved further west.
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Logging and Anishinaabeg Land Loss
Even where Indian land tenure seemed to be under close federal supervision, lumbermen developed sophisticated methods of cheaply gaining control of tribal forest resources. The lumber industry's assault on the Saginaw Ojibwe's reservation in central Michigan illustrates these tactics. In 1855 parts of six townships were reserved for the Ojibwe to make allotment selections and land purchases. Allotments were supposed to take place in 1855 and 1856, and then the Indians were to have a decade of federal stewardship to protect their title to the land. Instead, multiple agents so bungled the allotment process that a decade later there was no certainty who owned what land. Several times allotment took place, but lists were either poorly recorded or lost before they could make their way to Washington. It was not until 1870 and 1871 that the Michigan Anishinaabeg received fed-eral patents on their land. By this time the Michigan lumber industry was the most powerful political and economic force in the state. In Washington the lumbermen used their infl uence with the Offi ce of Indian Affairs to have the majority of Ojibwe allotees ruled as "competent" and, therefore, able to own and sell their land without federal oversight. The Offi ce of Indian Affairs ruled the trust time had lapsed and local agents were given the authority to determine who was "competent." Most new landowners were declared "competent" and immediately set upon by lumbermen offering to buy their land or the right to cut their timber. Some Ojibwe committed to farming accepted the offer to have their timber cut in order to clear the land and to raise capital to buy livestock, seed, and build a home. Others went to their allotments only to fi nd that the timber had already been cut by loggers who had purposely cut what was known as a "round forty"-a practice in which loggers operating legally on, say, a forty-acre tract would purposely stray on to the adjoining land and denude it of timber. All too often such operators moved on before they could be brought to justice. Yet worse abuse was to come.
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The Methodist Church had done much to help the Saginaw Ojibwe adjust and even rebound from the land loss of the treaty era and the collapse of the old fur trade economy. Yet that institution was also deeply involved in the politics of nineteenth century Michigan. For two decades the Methodist Church all but had a hammerlock on the Michigan Indian Agency. Long before the celebrated "Peace Policy of General Grant," most agents were Methodist ministers or elders in the Church whose selection was approved by the Church. Some of the agents were well meaning if not especially competent; some were corrupt and in league with some of the leading lumbermen in the region. In 1868-69 Reverend George Bradley received payments from lumbermen for convincing his Indian congregation to sell the timber rights on their allotments at prices well below market value and did so even before the allotment process was completed. He was later elevated to the offi ce of Indian Agent. Even worse was the career of Reverend George Betts, who served as Indian Agent from 1871 to 1876. Betts entered into a lucrative partnership with a cabal of local lumbermen. As Indian Agent, Betts issued allotments to Indians within the Isabella reservation, declared them "competent," then he would immediately pass on the information to lumbermen who could target the new landowners. Many were unaware of how valuable good pine tracts were. One Ojibwe who had been declared "competent" sold his timber for $15 to a lumberman who later laughed that the trees were worth $4,000. Even more effective at turning over reservation land to the lumbermen was Betts's practice of issuing patents to nonexistent or deceased individuals. Perhaps as many as four hundred such patents were issued leading to the immediate plundering of the valuable timber on the land. Complaints about Betts's corruption began to pile up in Washington within a year of his taking offi ce, yet no offi cial investigation took place until January 1876. He was eventually terminated, and several thousand acres of land were returned to the reservation. But Betts never faced criminal charges and he escaped with a small fortune. 16 An important part of the lumbermen's tactics to defraud the Ojibwe was complicity by their fellow tribesmen. John Irons, a Methodist preacher and tribal member, was an active agent of the lumber companies. Another Ojibwe John M. Collins used his position as the offi cial interpreter on the Isabella reservation to promote Betts's bogus allotments to the local chiefs. His deal with local logger Irving Arnold netted Collins $15 for every allotment he helped Arnold purchase. A number of the Isabella reservation chiefs were aware of Betts's wrongdoing yet still supported him in petitions to Washington that helped to delay the agent's removal from offi ce. Both Betts and the ring of timber agents who profi ted off reservation land were skillful at using intratribal rivalries and factions to gain the cooperation of Ojibwe leaders. Leaders who one year might complain to Washington about the loss of tribal land could be turned the next year when frustration over government inactivity prompted them to join the rush for profi t. In 1878 Chief James Nauckchegame alerted the Offi ce of Indian Affairs to a large timber trespass on Indian land. He provided an exact legal description of the tract and named the individual guilty of the timber theft. After nothing was done, it is little wonder that Naukchegame entered into a cooperative arrangement with one of the worst timber thieves. Ojibwe lived in a gold rush atmosphere heated by a post-Civil War culture of corruption that permeated the towns around the reservation with most prominent white men guilty of breaking or manipulating the law with impunity. Nonetheless, it was the Ojibwe who profi ted least and suffered most from the lumbermen's swindles. By 1876, through a process that was a largely fraudulent, only a few thousand acres of the more than 92,000 acres that had been set aside as the Isabella Ojibwe Reservation remained in Indian hands. The tactics employed by lumber frontier settlers toward the Saginaw Ojibwe were also applied to the Odawa in western Michigan. The Grand River Odawa had been given a large reservation in Oceana County from which to make individual allotments. Less than one year after four hundred patents had been issued to these people one timber land speculator had already bought up more than six thousand acres of land. The Odawa were actually in a worse situation than the Ojibwe. The later had been able to negotiate a Treaty in 1864 that allowed children upon reaching maturity to continue to take allotments as long as there was land available with the Isabella reserve. The Odawa, however, were limited to allotments granted to the generation that signed the 1855 treaty with the United States even though the reserves created had much more available land. In the 1860s and 1870s the Odawa pressed the government to allow the next generation to also claim allotments. Finally, in 1872 Congress addressed the issue. Odawa who came of age after the 1855 treaty would be given a six month window of opportunity to claim 160 acres, each within either the Oceana County reserve or ones at Grand Traverse Bay or Little Traverse Bay. However, these lands were not allotments. Instead the land was to be taken under the terms of the Homestead Act, which required that claimants dwell on and improve their property for fi ve years before they could be awarded a fee-simple patent. Failure to improve the property or to dwell there could result in a loss of the claim. The 1872 law was sponsored by Senator Thomas Ferry who was in league with the lumbermen of the Grand River Valley. Their interests were well served by the provision in the law that opened the Odawa reserves to European American purchase and settlement once the six-month homestead window closed. That same year a railroad connected Little Traverse Bay with the national rail network making the timber resources all the more valuable. Lumbermen were by no means content with merely being able to purchase the bulk of the timberlands within the Odawa reserves. Rather they set about designing tactics to seize the newly claimed Odawa homesteads.
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The results were particularly devastating for the Little Traverse Odawa. Since the 1820s they had followed a path of resistance through accommodation toward the United States. Through alliances with the Catholic Church and mixed-blood businessmen in the Mackinac Straits area, they had gradually become Christianized. They could read and write text based on a syllabary in their own Anishinaabeg language, and many had become successful participants in the regional economy through commercial fi shing and maple sugar harvesting. This was an accommodation to the new European American economy in the region but one that allowed for continued traditional activities such as pursuit of the seasonal cycle of movement across the land. Band member Andrew J. Blackbird had played a signifi cant role in lobbying the State of Michigan to recognize Indians as citizens while still protecting their treaty rights. Beginning in 1856 the Little Traverse Odawa began the work of running the recently created Emmet County, Michigan. Educated Indians were elected to positions as deputy sheriff, township supervisor, and in Blackbird's case register of deeds and probate judge and in later years as county treasurer and sheriff. Almost overnight the Little Traverse band went from being wards of the federal government to masters of their own Michigan local government. Indian Agent Henry Gilbert wrote to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs that the Odawa "have an organized county and with some help manage to get along with their business." During the Civil War Odawa young men had served with distinction in the First Michigan Sharpshooters. But in the wake of that confl ict northern Michigan was transformed by a rising tide of white settlers. In 1870 the Odawa made up 95 percent of the population of the county, and their allotments were still protected in federal trust. By 1880 there were 5,500 more whites than Indians and most allotments were removed from trust protection. The majority of the newcomers were tied to the growing lumber industry as Michigan surged to the forefront in national lumber production. As the number of European Americans grew, the number of Odawa elected to public offi ce shrunk; their role in public life gradually disappeared; and their lands, both allotments and homesteads, were in danger.
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In the late 1870s the newcomers began a systematic assault on Odawa lands. Andrew Blackbird was drawn into a desperate defense of their individual holdings. During the 1860s Blackbird had served as the local representative of the Offi ce of Indian Affairs. He had been educated at Twinsburg Academy in Ohio and at Michigan State Teachers College. Although in the 1870s he did not hold an offi cial position either in the government or tribe, many Odawa turned to him when trouble arose with the European Americans. Particularly vulnerable were Odawa who had taken homesteads within the Little Traverse reserve. A particularly poignant case was that of Lucy Penaseway, an Odawa widow with four young children. She had built a comfortable cabin on her claim, planted a garden and the beginnings of an orchard. In late summer she and her children left their claim for several weeks to pick berries, as was the Odawa tradition. When she returned, she found a white family living in her house, using her furniture. The white family were stand-ins for what the press called "land sharks" or "timber sharks." They looked for vulnerable Indian claims then approached the Traverse City Land Offi ce clerks to fi le their own claim on the land on the grounds that the Indians had abandoned it. This would necessitate a public hearing. The land offi ce would print a notice of the hearing in the Grand Traverse Herald. Federal regulations also stipulated that notice of a hearing was to be "personally served" when "practicable." A well-placed bribe could ensure that such a personal notice was not "practicable" and an Odawa homestead could be lost without the owner ever knowing. Blackbird tried to intervene of Lucy Penaseway's behalf. He got the Indian Agent to appeal to the Department of the Interior, yet while the matter worked its way through the bureaucracy, the "timber sharks" had the tract stripped of all its merchantable timber. Indian Agent George Lee could only complain that Penaseway's shabby treatment was "as bad as the most heartless treatment of ex-slaves of the South." In another case, two Odawa Civil War veterans lost their homestead claim because they did not have the funds to travel in the dead of winter with witnesses the seventy miles to the hearing.
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Nor did Indian allotments escape the attention of the "timber sharks." Local government that had once been under Odawa control was turned into a tool for land seizures. The Odawa held land under a variety of tenure regimes. Some held allotments from which the federal trust period had expired. Others were private property owners of tracts purchased decades before with funds from the original 1836 land cession, while still others claimed land under the 1862 Homestead Act. For all of these Indian citizens property tax rates soared as European Americans occupied public offi ce. Certainly the developing region had a growing need for road improvements and an expanded public education system. Yet under the Odawa administration of the county the annual tax on eighty acres of unimproved forest land was only one dollar. Under the newcomers the fee jumped to $32.85. The need to raise cash to pay this hefty fee pushed some Odawa to seek wage labor and others to abandon their allotments altogether. Margaret Boyd, Andrew Blackbird's sister, complained to President Ulysses S. Grant that the steep assessments were designed solely to "take our Lands away from us poor Indians." Boyd who had been educated at a Catholic convent school took the extraordinary step of making the "long and bitter journey" to appeal personally to the president. In Washington she met with the Commissioner of Indian Affairs and was briefl y ushered into Grant's offi ce before being quickly passed off to Julia Dent Grant. Boyd felt she failed in her mission, but her visit and her brother's letters did prompt the government to dispatch a Department of the Interior investigator. Edwin J.
Brooks of the General Land Offi ce reviewed fi fty-two cases at the Traverse City offi ce. In the overwhelming majority of the cases he found the Odawa had been "grossly imposed upon."
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Federal offi cials investigating the land frauds against the Odawa received little cooperation from local authorities. Instead, they encountered undisguised hostility toward the Odawa. The leading men of the community believed it was justifi able to "use every means possible" to "dispose them of their lands." It was considered standard practice to snare Indians in debt through the sale of luxury items or the extension of credit at usury rates, to threaten property owners with violence, or simply to trick Indians into signing quit-claim deeds. Others waited and watched like wolves to pick off the weak. One speculator pointed to an Indian landowner and told investigator Edwin Brooks he "will be hard up next winter then I can buy his land at my own fi gures." These actions and the hostility they revealed deeply discouraged Andrew Blackbird. He had married an English woman and had mixed-blood children. For years he worked as an interlocutor between whites and Indians. Yet he was shocked by the "great antipathy and prejudice" that was rampant "which makes us feel we have no country now which we might call our own." He despaired when he was unable to successfully defend his brother's farm from seizure or his sister from an outrageous lawsuit. Blackbird was barely able to hold on to his allotment when a prominent land speculator attempted to fi le a cross claim on the property. Blackbird was left to fume about the "sharp Lawyer thieves" who ensured that in a local court "an Indian has no chance for justice."
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Michigan Indian agents were ineffective in protecting Native American land from lumber company plunder. Indeed, several agents were active in profi ting from the plunder. Even those who meant well and made an ethical effort were frustrated by the sheer size of the agency they supervised. The ten thousand or so Indians in Michigan lived in widely separated reserves across the northern portion of the state while the agency was headquartered in Detroit. Usually the agent visited each agency only once a year; otherwise they monitored developments through correspondence from the Indians. All too often they responded to complaints bureaucratically by passing the issue on to Washington and awaiting instructions. In 1888 the Anishinaabeg made an effort to have one of their own appointed as the agent. Two candidates were put forward. Reverend John Rix Robinson, an Odawa mixed-blood with experience on the Isabella Reserve, would have continued the Methodist Church's lock on the offi ce. Andrew J. Blackbird had twice before been employed by the Offi ce of Indian Affairs, and he had the support of the local Women's National Indian Association. Blackbird, who seems to have had the inner track, hoped to give "a good shaking to those robbers of the region." The Michigan congressional delegation was under considerable pressure-caught between supporters of the Indians and the lumber interests. The latter found a way to relieve the burden. No agent was appointed; instead, without even consulting the Offi ce of Indian Affairs, Congress simply defunded the Michigan Agency. It was a bitter blow to educated Anishinaabeg like Blackbird who trusted that government could yet make things right.
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What happened to the Ojibwe and Odawa in Michigan was by no means unique. The Ojibwe in Wisconsin and the Anishinaabeg on the Canadian side of the border experienced a similar process. James T. Gregory, the federal Indian agent in northwestern Wisconsin, openly facilitated the logging of the Bad River reserve. That should not have surprised anyone, since prior to his appointment he had been an employee of the Superior Lumber Company in Ashland, Wisconsin, and his appointment was in response to vigorous lobbying by said company which then went on to mill most of the timber cut on the reservation. When complaints that the reservation was being plundered of its only valuable asset roused a congressional investigation, Gregory argued that the rapid cutting of Ojibwe timber was a positive good because it sped the way for those people's "civilized improvement." What is striking in retrospect is the similarity of abuse that occurred across the entire broad sweep of the Great Lakes forests. Indeed, the process of dispossession that occurred among Saginaw Ojibwe was eerily similar to what historian Melissa Meyer documented occurred at the Ojibwe White Earth Reservation in far northern Minnesota during the fi rst two decades of the twentieth century. Sadly the nearly half century of time between the Saginaw and White Earth tragedies had done nothing to enlighten Indian policy. 24 
Lumber Frontier Colonialism in Perspective
The logging frontier's expansion into Anishinaabeg lands was facilitated by a broad failure of both federal resource management and Indian policy. Across the Great Lakes and Upper Mississippi regions of the Midwest, the allotment policy was carried out with the expectation that Indians would use the land as agriculturalists. Save for isolated tracts, however, the forested lands of the region were not suited to subsistence agriculture. The experience of European American settlers in New England and parts of upstate New York should have been an example of how problematic it was to develop forest farms. The task of clearing timber was formidable, and it ensured that these lands were the most expensive to settle. When loggers cut timber on land, it was not really cleared as they inevitably left behind stumps, dense piles of branches, and thin tree tops that became a great fi re hazard. All too often allotment tracts were on sandy, shallow soiled areas with stands of pine that could never pay as farms. When deciduous forest lands with deep black soil were claimed by Anishinaabeg, they were often managed for small-scale maple sugar production. Old growth forests of pine, cedar, and hardwoods gave the land its most marketable value, but the Offi ce of Indian Affairs made no provision for helping Indians to manage large stands of valuable timber. The very process of subdividing reservations through severalty made it impossible to manage the exploitation of forests as a sustaining tribal resource. The opening of reservation lands to white purchase was an invitation for the "timber sharks" to feed.
The Menominee Indians in Wisconsin and the Ojibwe at Red Lake in Minnesota were unique in their ability to withstand pressure from both local lumbermen and the U.S. Congress to sell off the tribe's timber rights and subdivide their reservation. The Menominee avoided this with the help of William T. Richardson, the agent at Green Bay. The Menominee set up their own Indian lumber camp and gradually cut and later milled the reservation lumber themselves and did so in a sustained way. The Red Lake band was only able to avoid allotment by surrendering four-fi fths of its reservation. The ceded portion was quickly logged over, but the remaining Red Lake reservation was protected as a tribal estate and eventually selectively logged by tribally owned mills. The Menominee and Red Lake examples suggest the transformational role that could be played by conscientious Indian Agents and united, determined tribal leadership. In most of the region, however, this did not happen and instead there was a rapid cutting of fi rst the best pine and later the hardwood timber, a process that took only a generation, followed by the gradual harvesting of the rest of the forest for cordwood or pulpwood which continued well into the twentieth century. Federal timber agents were no more able to protect trees on federal land than federal Indian agents were able to protect Anishinaabeg forestlands. A program of wasteful plunder was the result. With homesteads lost and allotments logged over, the best the Anishinaabeg could expect from the logging frontier was occasional employment in lumber camps.
In the wake of the logging frontier, the entire region tried to cope with a radically transformed forest ecology that took the creation of county, state, and national forests to gradually restore. Those forest reserves saw a return of a vast portion of the land in the region to government ownership. It is ironic that a policy based on weaning the Indians from collective to individual private property was replaced, beginning with the 1911 Weeks Act, with a federal policy in which government reassumed collective control of some of the very same lands. The ethic behind the public forest system was to manage timberlands for the common good. Within a single generation, tribal communal ownership was decried as barbaric and replaced with private property, which resulted in waste and ruin and had to be replaced by a new system of communal ownership. There was, however, a signifi cant difference in this new land management regime. State and federal forests included a regulatory regime that controlled Indian access to the land especially hunting, fi shing, and gathering activities. In the wake of the logging frontier, the Anishinaabeg faced greatly reduced opportunities to exercise traditional subsistence practices.
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Both the European Americans and Indigenous people of the Great Lakes forest region were essentially caught in the colonial grip of urban America. Lumbermen, who successfully fought off government regulation of forestlands, trumpeted the power and rationality of the free market. Yet there was little that was fair or rational in the way the lumber market functioned. Financial capital based in Detroit, Milwaukee, but especially Chicago, controlled the harvesting of the natural capital represented in the forest. A dependable lumber market like Chicago, the largest in the world by 1870, was essential to turn "green gold" into bankable dollars. Most Great Lakes region logging companies had a partner based in Chicago or another major city to handle marketing and to arrange the annual fi nancing of operations. Because Chicago drew logs from throughout the region, it was a buyer's market with prices set low. Yet lumbermen embraced the market there because their desperate need for cash brought them to where lumber could be sold fast and in large volume. The urban market manipulated lumbermen in the region just as they manipulated Indian allotments to their advantage. This type of unequal relationship was at the core of colonial economics, as was the disparity in living standards that fl owed from it. The rugged conditions of the lumber camp, saw mill, or homestead tract-white or Indian-were in stark contrast to the mansions enjoyed by lumber barons and commission merchants in the city. That inequality only increased over time as the lumber industry transformed the midwestern forest into what was by the early twentieth century the Great Lakes cutover region: the devastated and denuded northern third of Michigan, Wisconsin, and Minnesota.
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The colonialism of the logging frontier differed signifi cantly from the settler colonialism that forced the removal of most of the Indigenous people of the lower Midwest. Lumbermen were less interested in Indian land than they were in the resources that were on the land. Once timber was cut from land swindled from Indians, it was often abandoned by lumbermen and allowed to return to the state as a tax foreclosure or sold to poor farmers duped into thinking the cutover had agricultural promise. The civil rights of citizenship and land ownership that leaders such as Mackadepenessy and Andrew Blackbird fought to achieve did not protect the Odawa and Ojibwe allotments from being plundered. This sad state of affairs had been well documented by 1880 in the press and in the reports of federal offi cials. Nonetheless, in 1887 the alleged Friends of the American Indian pushed through Congress the General Allotment Act that would apply nearly the same policy that had failed in Michigan to Indians in Minnesota and in the western United States. Michigan had two decades of experience with allotment, Indian citizenship, and Indian land loss, yet that example was willfully ignored.
The pine logging frontier was a white-capped wave that washed over the northern Great Lakes region in little more than a generation. When it had crested, European American settlement to some extent receded, leaving ghost towns and shrunken, economically challenged communities in its wake. The Anishinaabeg remained. Catholic parishes and Methodist congregations and camp meetings helped to sustain a people left largely impoverished by the failure of federal Indian policy. Those core vessels of community remained useful tools of resistance that helped to sustain pride, tradition, and education and in the twentieth century produced leaders who reestablished tribal sovereignty and an Indian role in determining how the resources of the region are managed. 
